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We present  a small open economy version of Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (2000) and, 
based  on Swedish data,  we show  that there exists a negatively sloped long run 
Phillips curve. Regressions on quarterly data  1963-2000 and  estimated inflation 
expectations show that this Phillips curve is relatively robust and that an 
unemployment rate of close to two percent is consistent with an inflation target 
slightly above its present level of two percent. However, estimations based on survey 
data suggest that a considerably higher inflation rate, of around four percent, is 
necessary to yield a lowest sustainable unemployment rate. These latter estimates 
seem better adjusted to the recent Swedish macroeconomic experiences. If Sweden 
enters the EMU, and if the ECB targets inflation at a lower level than the Riksbank, 
employment as well as output will be lower than today. Moreover, if the inflation-
unemployment trade-off differs widely across the member states of the EMU, then a 
single inflation rate in the EMU-area implies that long run unemployment rates will 
also differ across the member countries. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
The notion of a negatively sloped Phillips curve has been at the center of 
economic policy discussions and macroeconomics ever since a model of 
the relation between inflation and unemployment was first presented in 
1958.
1 The original form of this relationship reads wg = f(u) + kp where wg 
is wage growth, u is unemployment, p is inflation and k is a constant. If 
inflation is interpreted as expected inflation, and if a fixed price mark-up is 
added, a negatively sloped price Phillips curve is obtained for the short run 
as well as the long run. This result provided policy makers for many years 
to come with an argument to intervene since it implies that the government 
has a choice between low inflation/high unemployment and low unemploy-
ment/high inflation by means of appropriate policy measures.  
However, in the late sixties, Milton Friedman (1968) and Edmund 
Phelps (1968) pointed out that the value of the constant k is crucial for the 
interpretation of the long run Phillips curve. A value of  k less than unity 
implies money illusion since wages then increase by less than prices. With 
a unit value of  k the long run Phillips curve must be vertical at a “natural 
rate of unemployment”. This observation suggested that governments 
should not intervene since, in the long run, unemployment cannot deviate 
from its natural rate. To this “natural rate” critique of Keynesian economic 
policy was later added the rational expectations revolution from which it 
was concluded that the government could not even stabilize unemployment 
around its natural rate.
2 Both of  these highly influential schools thus 
concluded that the policy maker does  not have a choice between 
unemployment and inflation. Since the natural rate is obtainable at any 
inflation rate, policy makers can only choose the inflation rate. In the late 
20th  century governments in many countries instructed their central banks 
to target inflation at historically low rates.  
Despite the widespread recognition of the latter theories, the natural rate 
of unemployment has been notoriously difficult to identify in e mpirical 
studies. In particular, low and stable inflation rates have been shown to 
coexist with a wide range on unemployment rates. In recent years, studies 
by King and Watson (1994) and Fair (2000) have found that for the U.S. 
there exists a trade-off also in the long run between unemployment and 
inflation.  
Also recent theoretical research has challenged the notion of a vertical 
long run Phillips curve by offering micro-economic rationales for a trade-
                                                                 
1 Phillips (1958). See also Lipsey (1960). 
2 Lucas (1972), Sargent (1973).   2 
off between unemployment and inflation. Akerlof, Dickens and Perry 
(1996), builds on the adverse effects of low inflation on real wage 
flexibility as originally discussed by Tobin (1972). Holden (2001) 
constructs a bargaining model based on legislation features that rules out 
nominal wage cuts and which gives workers a stronger bargaining position 
at low inflation. This, in turn, is shown to yield a higher unemployment 
level at low inflation rates. A basic feature of these studies, be it by 
assumption or by model prediction, is that agents for various reasons 
behave differently in low inflation periods than they do in high inflation 
periods.  
A recent study by George Akerlof, William Dickens and George Perry 
(2000), (henceforth ADP) assumes a change in agents’ behavior as the 
economy shifts between high and low inflation regimes. They specify a 
model that generates a negatively sloped long run Phillips curve at low 
rates of inflation. The point of departure, supported by numerical examples, 
is that at low inflation rates, firms’ losses from disregarding inflation are 
modest. If inflation is disregarded at low inflation rates, the firm sets a 
lower wage and a lower price relative to nominal aggregate demand. 
Hence, unemployment can be sustained at lower levels than would be the 
case if inflation were fully accounted for. At high inflation, however, firms 
make large losses by neglecting inflation. Consequently, inflation will be 
fully accounted for, and wages and prices are adjusted to nominal 
aggregate demand, which implies that the long run Phillips curve regains 
its vertical position at high levels of inflation.  
Their theoretical model is successfully estimated on U.S. data, and the 
results are surprisingly robust with respect to alternative data sources and 
specifications. Influenced by the ADP model, Wyplosz (2001) presents 
results using data on France, Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands. 
He finds that the long-run unemployment rate is a non-linear function of 
inflation and his (preliminary) conclusion is that the ECB’s view that very 
low inflation is good for the economy is not empirically supported. 
A crucial feature of the ADP model is the identification of an inflation 
rate that minimizes unemployment. We denote this inflation rate the 
LSURI – the Lowest Sustainable Unemployment Rate of Inflation.
3 For the 
U.S., ADP find that macroeconomic policy should aim at an inflation rate 
between 1.5 and 4 percent if the lowest sustainable unemployment rate is to 
be obtained.  
The notion of an LSURI is of a particular interest to countries like 
Sweden with an explicit inflation target. For instance, the inflation target of 
                                                                 
3 This lowest rate of unemployment need not be compatible with maximum output since 
productivity is low at minimum unemployment. See Section 3, below.   3 
the Swedish Riksbank is set at two percent without much consideration of 
the question if this level of inflation is consistent with maximum output or 
minimum unemployment.
4 If an LSURI can be identified, this could 
constitute a reason to revise, upwards or downwards, the inflation target.  
The  idea of a rate of inflation that minimizes unemployment is however 
even more intriguing in face of the formation of the Economic and 
Monetary Union, EMU. Results in Wyplosz (2001) suggest that the 
European Central Bank should aim at an inflation rate of more than 5 %, 
i.e. way above the present inflation range of the ECB. Moreover, since a 
monetary union implies identical inflation rates across member countries, 
the uniform inflation rate that the ECB targets, below 2 percent, could well 
imply very different unemployment rates across the members. Unless 
LSURI is identical across European economies, individual countries could 
potentially obtain more output and employment outside the monetary 
union. In light of the fact that Sweden still is outside the union, information 
on the relationship between inflation and unemployment seems even more 
relevant. 
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the ADP model on Swedish data 
so as to shed light on the effects of a two percent inflation rate and to see if 
other targets would tend to generate a lower long run unemployment level. 
Unlike ADP we will study a small open economy, which implies a 
dependence of data on external factors that need to be accounted for in the 
regressions.  
Our regressions suggest that it is possible to come down to unemploy-
ment rates in the region of 2.0-2.5 percent. However, the inflation rate that 
yields this unemployment differs between regressions based on unobserved 
but estimated inflation expectations  and  observed data on expectations. 
Using estimated expectations our model  suggests an inflation rate around 
2.6 percent, while survey data imply a rate of approximately 4 percent. 
In the next section we briefly present the microeconomic foundations of 
the basic assertion that agents, when setting wages and prices, do not fully 
account for inflation at low rates of inflation. We then proceed to the 
formal model in Section 3, and in Section 4 we present the empirical 
specification and our results. The final section offers some concluding 




                                                                 
4 Two percent, rather than zero, is chosen since it offers some margins to deflation.    4 
2. Why inflation is disregarded at low rates 
 
ADP offer a range of arguments as to why inflation would not be a major 
concern in wage- and price setting at low rates and we shall here only 
briefly review their arguments.  
Firms are assumed to be either rational or “near-rational”. One argument 
for why firms are not always fully rational is based on the psychology of 
perception, which  suggests that an item must reach a threshold of 
importance before it is even perceived. This implies that firms would 
ignore factors that are considered to have only modest effects on profits. 
ADP show that losses from disregarding inflation are negligible at low 
inflation rates, and firms would then rather focus on other considerations of 
greater importance to profitability.
5 As Alan Blinder has argued, “a 
prominent definition of price stability is inflation so low that it ceases to be 
a factor in influencing decisions”.
6 At a low enough inflation rate, nominal 
wage- and price contracts will be increasingly common. 
An increase in inflation would lead to the setting of a higher wage or 
price, but the effect would be less than one for one. ADP offers several 
references to compensation consultants who advice against linking wage 
changes to changes in the cost of living. If automatic increases in wages 
and salaries are granted in response to inflation, this would reduce the 
amount of funds available to differentiate for performance.
7 
These arguments for why price increases not necessarily come through at 
full effect in wage increases are based on the assumption that the firm 
unilaterally sets the wage. For an economy like the Swedish where wages 
are partly bargained, one could argue that the Riksbank’s explicit (two 
percent) inflation target would weaken the reasons to neglect inflation. The 
point of such a regime is that social partners can bargain for wage increases 
based on fairly “safe” forecast of two percent consumer price inflation for 
the contract period. This could increase the perception of inflation in firms 
where wages are bargained and ADP’s argument above would apply only 
to wages and salaries unilaterally set by firms.  
ADP argue that even if firms w ere rational, in the sense that they in all 
respects consider everything that can affect profits, they would not consider 
the actual inflation rate unless the employees fully appreciate the true 
                                                                 
5 As noted by ADP firms are, in this respect, no different from academic model builders 
who ignore factors that are of minor importance to the problem to be studied. 
6 Blinder et. al. (1998). 
7 ADP do not explain, however, why this argument would only be relevant at low rates 
of inflation.   5 
inflation rate. There exist evidence that the lay public differs from 
professional economists in their views on inflation; wage and salary earners 
systematically underestimate the effects of inflation on the wages that their 
employers will want to pay them. The public would view inflation merely 
as a factor that reduces real wages, and unlike the economist, is unable to 
see that inflation also raises the nominal wage. This lack of general 
equilibrium thinking constitutes one reason for why wage- and price setters 
can be expected to less than fully incorporate low inflation rates. Also in 
this respect one can expect behavior to depend on the rate of inflation. Only 
at high enough inflation rates, when inflation is widely discussed in media 
and consumers see prices increase, will inflation enter workers’ minds and 
can be considered to be a prominent argument in wage demands. Hence, 
both firms and workers are likely to pay attention to inflation only insofar 
that it exceeds some minimum level. 
Both assumptions of near-rational firms or of rational firms with 
employees that underestimate the effects of inflation on the nominal wage 
will yield the same conclusion namely that the Phillips curve has a 
negatively sloped element at low rates of inflation. In fact, the model that 
we shall estimate can be thought of simply as a way of testing whether 
agents react differently to low inflation than to high inflation, irrespective 
of what the reason thereof may be. This means that even if we obtain 
evidence that low inflation is disregarded in wage and price setting, it is not 
possible for us to infer what the reasons thereof may be and, indeed, the 
true reason could be one that has not been mentioned above. It is only 
possible to conclude that evidence of a negatively sloped Phillips curve at 
low inflation levels is consistent with the presented arguments.  
 
 
3.   The model 
 
Let  p be the average consumer price level. For a small open economy, this 
price is determined as a weighted average of the prices set by domestic 
producers and foreign producers: 
 
(1) dm pmpmp =-+         (1) 
 
where  d p  is the domestic consumer price,  m p  the price of imported 
consumer goods, and  m is the value of imports as a share of total 
consumption. Let M be the supply of money. The quantity theory, with a 
constant normalized to unity, then gives us real income (aggregate demand)   6 
as  / Mp . We assume n monopolistically competitive firms that divide up 
total aggregate demand between them according to the relative  prices for 
their respective goods. These firms may be either domestic or foreign but in 
the following we focus in solely on the behavior of domestic firms. 
Domestic firm i sets the price  d
i p  for its product, and demand is divided 
between the firms according to the relative price for the output. This 
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where b is the price elasticity of demand.  
There are two types of firms; rational firms indexed  j=r and near-
rational firms, indexed  j=nr. Firms set efficiency wages that minimize 
labor cost per efficiency unit. Effort (productivity) depends upon workers’ 
outside opportunities. These are determined by two factors. The first is the 
standard argument that the higher is the unemployment rate the more effort 
is the worker willing to supply in order to avoid being laid off. The second 
argument is the perceived gap between the wage at their own firm and the 
outside wage. This perceived gap depends upon the current wage and a 
reference wage giving the perception of other workers’ wages. Workers’ 
reference wage is the same in the two types of firms, while firms, as shown 
below, will set different wages depending on whether they are rational or 
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where wj is the wage paid by firms type j, w
R the worker’s reference wage, 
u the unemployment rate, a a positive constant less than one and  A, B and 
C are all positive constants. All workers determine the reference wage as 
1(1) Re w w p - =+ , i.e. last years’ average wage,  1 w- , plus expected inflation 
in consumer prices p
e. 
Firms set prices and wages for the next period after having projected the 
effects of inflation on the reference wage of their workers. This expected 
reference wage, w
eR, determines the level of wages that a firm should pay. 
Let  qj denote, for firm type  j, the share of expected inflation that i s 
incorporated into the reference wage. If a firm is fully rational all expected 
inflation is considered and qr = 1. For less than rational firms, or “near-  7 
rational” firms, we set qnr = 0, which means that at low inflation a fraction 
of firms will totally disregard inflation for the reasons discussed in section 
2.
8 For firm type j the expected reference wage is:  
 
1(1) eRe
jj wwq p - =+  for j=r, nr.       (4) 
 
We then see that only for rational firms (for which  qr  = 1) will the 
reference wage be identical to workers’ actual reference wage. 
Let  e
j e  be the effort that firm of type  j expects to obtain from their 
employees. Firms know  that unemployment will affect effort and hence 
they form expectations also about unemployment. Hence, firms paying wj 
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where u
e is expected unemployment.  
Since the two types of firms apply different reference wages, the wages 
they set will differ as well. The efficiency wage paid by each firm will be 
such that the unit labor cost in terms of expected effort (3’), 
e
j j we , is 
















.       (5) 
 
The rational firm applies a higher reference wage and thus sets a higher 
wage than the near-rational firm, but, as seen in (5), the relation between 
the wage and the expected reference wage is identical in the two types of 
firms.  
Wages are reset relative to the reference wage in each period and since 
wages in both types of firm are multiples of last period’s average wage, 




p =+ .  
                                                                 
8 One could assume that 0 £ qnr  < 1  in which case qnr represents the share of inflation 
that is under-weighted. A similar interpretation applies in the case of rational  firms with 
employees who underweight inflation.   8 
Irrespective of the type of firms, prices are determined by a mark-up on the 
expected unit efficiency labor cost. The first order condition of the profit 
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where  b/(b-1) is the mark-up factor. Equation (6) shows that there is no 
long run one-to-one relationship between prices and wages. Changes in 
prices carry over not only to wages but also to productivity (effort) since 
the price is a mark-up on the wage in efficiency units and that inflation 
equals wage increases and productivity changes.       
While 
  e
rr ee = , actual and expected effort differ for near-rational firms, 
which must be considered when determining firm profits. Comparing (3) to 
(3’) for j=nr and using (5) we find that actual effort for near-rational firms 
obtains as  nr e = ((1)1)/ ee
nr e a paa - ++- . With the demand function (2) and 
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where the term outside brackets represents firm j:s share of total demand 
and the brackets show the profits per unit of output sold, i.e. the price less 
the wage in units of actual effort. The losses of being near-rational rather 
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Analysis of (8) shows that at low levels of inflation the losses of being 
near-rational are low. (See ADP pp. 15-16.) Firms are assumed to be 
willing to accept small losses up to some level before they become fully 
rational and incorporate inflation into their wage- and price setting. 
Heterogeneity enters by assuming a normal distribution of this threshold 
with mean m and standard deviation s, and we obtain the fraction of near 
rational price setters as: 
 
                                                                 




















-F ,   (9) 
 
where F is the standard cumulative normal distribution.  
It is appropriate at this stage to  summarize the  equation system. The 
basic model consists of equation (1), two equations (4), equation (3), two 
equations (5) and two equations (6). These eight equations determine eight 
unknowns p, , RR
nnr ww, e , , nnr ww, d
r p and  d
nr p  on their level form. To obtain 
the Phillips-relation between changes in output price and the 
unemployment level, we shall transform these variables into their rate of 
change form, and determine F, which then is used to determine the average 
price level. It will then be straightforward to determine domestic  price 
inflation in terms of unemployment and wage inflation. 
To derive the price Phillips curve, we proceed as follows.  Using 
equations (3’) and (5) in equation (6) we may determine  ,
d
nrt p and  ,
d
rt p . 




trtnrt ppp =F+-F       (10) 
 
which determines the average price level as a weighted average of prices of 
rational and near-rational firms. With the corresponding expression at t-1, 
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ADP derive (see their equation (13)) the short-run  wage Phillips curve 
















. Using the corresponding 
expression for one period back in (11) we obtain the short-run price 
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Taking logs and making the same approximations as ADP yields  
 
deee
tttt dguu ppg =-+F+D .      (13) 
 
The change in expected unemployment enters here since this change will 
affect productivity. (Equation (13) deviates somewhat from the 
corresponding expression reported by ADP in their footnote 26.) Note that 
since we have an open economy, the LHS inflation rate refers to inflation 
in domestically produced and consumed goods while the RHS expected 
inflation refers to CPI. 
The long run steady-state Phillips relation is characterized  by equality 
between actual and expected inflation and by a constant (and known) 
unemployment rate. In our open economy version, where  p = (1-m)p
d + 
mp
m we assume that exchange rates adjust so that, expressed in domestic 
currency,  p
m  =  p





p -F -=         (14) 
 
where u
n may be denoted the “natural” rate of unemployment here defined 
as the rate that obtains when all firms are rational. This rate is obtained as 
u
n = d/g. Unemployment will remain at this rate for large enough inflation 
since  F then equals one. The losses from disregarding inflation above a 
certain level (See ADP pp. 15-16) are large and firms will rationally 
include all inflation; hence F will be close to 1 at high inflation.  
At p = 0, i.e. at price stability, actual unemployment is also at the natural 
rate since disregarding zero inflation then is rational. However, at low but 
positive inflation rates, the long run Phillips curve is no longer vertical. At 
these levels, firms are near-rational and disregard the inflation rate 
implying that they will set a wage rate that is lower than they would have if 
inflation  were considered.  With a lower wage,  unemployment will be 
below the natural rate and the long run Phillips curve will include  a 
negatively sloped segment. 
At inflation rises, however, it will be more and more costly for firms to 
disregard inflation and they become  more  rational, i.e.  they incorporate 
fully the inflation rate into wage and price setting. At  some inflation rate, 
we enter a positively sloped segment of the Phillips curve that persists until 
inflation is so high that all firms are rational and the Phillips curve becomes 
vertical. This is illustrated in Figure 1.   11
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As is clear from  Figure 1, there exists a lowest sustainable unemploy-
ment rate of inflation (LSURI) yielding the lowest sustainable 
unemployment rate (LSUR). However, in general this point does not 
maximize output. The point of output maximization is s ituated on the 
positive segment. This can be inferred by the following reasoning. As we 
raise inflation above zero, unemployment  decreases and effort increases 
implying that output unambiguously goes up. Hence, LSURI is associated 
with a higher output level than any inflation rate lower than LSURI. 
However, as inflation increases above LSURI, unemployment  increases 
while effort continues to increase. Thus, for any unemployment level 
between LSUR and 
n u the points on the positive segment of the curve are 
superior to the corresponding point on the negative segment. Hence, while 
LSURI maximizes employment (minimizes unemployment), some point 
above LSURI maximizes output. 
In the section that follows we proceed to determine the econometric 
specification of Ö. 
 
 
Empirical specifications and data 
In line with ADP, we approximate the argument in the standard normal 
c.d.f. as derived in (9) by  2
L DE p + , where  2
L p  represents the effects of past 
inflation on the likelihood that people act rationally toward inflation and D 
and E are parameters. When ADP approximated the loss function by  2
L Ep  
(where E was chosen so that the approximation was identical to the “true” 
loss at 5 percent inflation) this loss was never off by more than 3 percent of 
the true loss. Moreover, a constant term, D, is also included so as not to 
constrain the share of rational firms to 50 percent at zero inflation. (For the   12
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where  12 ,,,, dDEaaand k are parameters, X is a vector of dummy variables, 
and ei is the error term.  
We proxy pL by several different specifications suggested by ADP. One 
is a geometrically declining weighted moving average of past inflation: 
 
  , ,11 (1) Lt Ltt pdpdp -- =-+       (16) 
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where l is estimated, i indexes quarters and I is set to 16 quarters back. In 
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= ￿ ) and the 
lag length  I is set  to 1 6 quarters. To reduce the number of parameters in 
estimation we simplify (18) by restricting  the  gi:s to be identical within 
each year. 
Inflation expectations p
e are sometimes available  in the form of survey 
data,  but  since  such data  often are  missing the common practice is to 
estimate expectations. In determining p
e, we assume, like ADP do, adaptive 
expectation and apply (16)-(18) also for this variable. In addition, we also 
run regressions allowing the weights in (18) to differ across quarters. After 
having run the model based on these variations of adaptive expectations, 
we  contrast the results thereof to those obtained using survey data on 
households’ inflation expectations.   13
In determining  expected unemployment, u
e, we set the lag length to either 
two or twelve periods. We first run regressions on open unemployment, but 
later vary these to include several alternative measures of unemployment.  
Our relevant price inflation index for the dependent variable is one that 
measures prices of goods produced domestically and consumed domesti-
cally. For a closed economy, like the US for which ADP estimate their 
model, a relevant index may be the consumer price index. This, however, 
would not be the case for a small open economy like the Swedish. Taking 
the differences of (1), holding the import share constant, we may derive the 
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which is our dependent variable. 
We estimate the model using annualized quarterly data from 1963:1 to 
2000:2. Our quarterly data are in turn based on the average value of the 
price level of the three months that constitute each quarter. To annualize 
our quarterly data we calculate the percentage change in the relevant price 
indices during the last four quarters.  
Estimating the model for a small open economy implies that one must 
consider the dependence on external factors. As mentioned above, our 
dependent variable, inflation in products produced and consumed in 
Sweden, is d etermined as the difference between CPI and imported 
inflation. However, our inflation series for imported goods includes not 
only consumption goods but also intermediary goods. This introduces a 
measurement error into our domestic inflation series in periods when prices 
of intermediate goods move differently than prices of consumption goods. 
To account for this, we specify a number of dummy variables in particular 
to capture oil price increases in 1973-74 and 1979-1981 and decreases in 
1986. Dummies also cover price hikes on food inputs in the early 1970s, 
the deviations between Swedish and foreign business cycles and the 
Swedish tax reform in 1990-91, and the extreme wage increases in 1995-96 
that can be traced to foreign increases in prices of pulp and paper. 
The variables are defined in greater detail in our appendix.  
 
     14
4.   Results 
 
Using maximum-likelihood methods we have estimated a total of 120 
versions of the model by varying inflation expectations, measures of 
unemployment and sample periods. Out of these we consider 113 to have 
come out without any major problems in terms of identification, 
meaningful parameter estimates etc. For the remaining cases we ran into 
similar problems as ADP did for the US. For instance, in some of these 
regressions, the estimates of D and E tended to approach minus infinity and 
infinity, respectively. We cannot say whether this is because of data 
limitations or if data actually reject the hypothesis that Ö varies with 
inflation; if the true value of F is unity, E and D cannot be identified. 
In the following result section we first focus on the results using 
estimated adaptive inflation expectations. We then compare these results to 
those obtained with survey data. These two different approaches are shown 
to yield interesting differences concerning the possibilities of minimizing 
unemployment at a low inflation rate.  
 
 
4.1   Adaptive expectations 
If the parameter E is zero, the coefficient on expectations will not vary with 
inflation, which would reject the theory. In 23 of our 24 regressions we 
find, though, that E is significantly positive as predicted by theory.
10 This is 
seen in Table 1, in which we present six estimations based on specifications 
that we believe are representative of our regressions. To get an overview of 
the full set of regressions,  Figure 2  displays the estimated lowest 
sustainable unemployment rate (LSUR) and the i nflation that yields this 
rate (LSURI) in each regression. We find that the average estimate of the 
lowest unemployment is 2.08 percent, which is obtainable when inflation is 
targeted at 2.61 percent. We see in the figure that the vast majority of 
unemployment rates ranges between 1.6 and 2.5 percent and that most 
inflation rates range between 2.0 and slightly above 3.0 percent. We 
believe that these variations are small, considering the changes that we 
have made in the way expectations are formed across the regressions. 
 
                                                                 
10 As discussed in section 2, we use four alternative measures for 
e p , three measures for 
pL, and two alternative lag lengths for unemployment. This gives us 24 possible 
combinations. In one regression we obtained estimates that implied a  Ö-coefficient 
equal to unity. We disregard this single regression in the following presentation.   15
Table 1. Estimated parameters for the long run Phillips curve 1963-2000
a 
Independent  
variables and  
characteristics 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
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weights, eq. (16) 
Geometrically 
declining 
weights, eq. (17) 
16-quarter MA 
with different 
weights for each 
year, eq. (18) 
Geometrically 
declining 
weights, eq. (16) 
Geometrically 
declining 
weights, eq. (17) 
16-quarter MA 
with different 
weights for each 






weights, eq. (17) 
16-quarter MA 
with different 
weights for each 
year, eq. (18) 
16-quarter MA 
with different 
weights for each 
year, eq. (18) 
Geometrically 
declining 
weights, eq. (16) 
16-quarter lag 
with different 
weights for each 
quarter, eq. (18) 
16-quarter lag 
with different 
weights for each 
quarter, eq. (18) 
Unemployment 
measure 
Open unempl.  Open unempl.  Open unempl.  Open unempl.  Open unempl.  Open unempl. 
No. of unempl. 
lags  2  12  2  12  2  12 
Sample period  1963:1-2000:2  1963:1-2000:2  1963:1-2000:2  1963:1-2000:2  1963:1-2000:2  1963:1-2000:2 
LSURI  2.98  2.81  2.64  2.38  2.54  2.23 
LSUR  1.61  1.94  2.26  2.57  2.08  2.71 
F(p=0.0)  30.0  51.9  60.2  67.9  55.6  71.6 
F(p=2.0)  39.9  60.6  68.7  76.4  65.5  80.1 
F(p=4.0)  70.7  82.6  87.9  93.1  88.2  95.3 
F(p=6.0)  97.0  98.0  99.0  99.7  99.4  99.9 
u(p=0.0)  5.28  4.66  4.11  4.65  4.43  4.19 
u(p=2.0)  2.15  2.23  2.40  2.63  2.21  2.73 
u(p=4.0)  2.23  2.51  2.79  3.46  2.91  3.50 
u(p=6.0)  4.81  4.29  3.94  4.57  4.31  4.17 
DW-statistic  1.531  1.506  1.348  1.619  1.518  1.551 
R
2  0.868  0.873  0.860  0.871  0.879  0.886 
a Asymptotic t-values in parentheses. Detailed results for all regressions are available on request.
   
   16




Source: Estimates from 23 regressions as described in the text. The mean of LSURI and  
LSUR is 2.61% and 2.08 %, respectively. 
 
For the US, ADP report that the inflation rate that minimizes the rate of 
unemployment ranges between 1.6 and 3.4 percent. In comparison, the 
average LSURI in  Figure 2 is almost in the middle of the range obtained 
for the US. The lowest sustainable unemployment rate, however, is in 
general considerably higher for the US than for Sweden. ADP report that 
the lowest sustainable unemployment often exceeds 4 percent. Thus, the 
potential for achieving a sustainable and low unemployment rate seems 
considerably better for Sweden than for the US.
11 
 In Figure 3 we have plotted each estimated unemployment rate obtained 
at 0, 2, 6 and 8 percent inflation and fitted the Phillips curve through the 
average open unemployment rate at these inflation rates. To this we have 
then added the average LSUR/LSURI point to obtain the full Phillips 
curve. This “average Phillips curve” becomes vertical at around 7 percent 
inflation, implying that all agents are fully rational at this inflation rate. We 
also see from  Table 1 that the share of rational firms F at zero inflation 
varies across these models from 30 percent (model 1) to 72 (model 6). 
Thus, already at price stability a large share of the firms appears to act fully  
                                                                 
11 Note that this holds for open unemployment. The results are different when we 
measure unemployment in terms of  total unemployment, i.e. when we include workers 
in labor market programs. Later in this section we shall show that the Swedish LSUR 
then becomes comparable to the US LSUR.














Figure 3.   The Phillips curve  
 
rational, i.e. to fully incorporate inflation into their wage and price 
decisions. Nevertheless, this share is small enough to yield the expected 
shape of the Phillips curve. At six percent inflation, the lowest share of 
fully rational firms is 97 percent implying that almost all  firms  take 
inflation into account at this rate. The share of rational firms at 6 percent is 
somewhat higher than that obtained by ADP for their US sample 
suggesting that adjustment is slightly faster in Sweden as inflation rises. 
 
 










































































Figure  4 shows how the value of the coefficient on inflationary expecta-
tions F changes over time in one of the representative models.
12 There are 
large variations within t he zero to unity range. The share of rational firms 
that fully incorporate inflation into wage- and price setting dropped to very 
low levels in the late sixties but increased rapidly to unity again when 
inflation increased in the early seventies. The ceiling of 1 was hit during 
most of the seventies and eighties. Then there is a large drop in the share of 
rational firms in the nineties when inflation dropped to close to zero. The 
overall impression is that firms react fast to changes in the rate of inflation.  
The curvature of the “average Phillips curve” in Figure 3, may be used 
to illustrate the gains in terms of employment by changing the rate of 
inflation, for instance by moving from zero inflation to the rate that yields 
the minimum long run unemployment rate.
13 The marginal gains are the 
largest as we leave absolute price stability, and the gains are gradually 
reduced as we approach LSURI at 2.61 percent. The average unemploy-
ment reduction is close to 2.56 percentage points.
14 Our results therefore 
suggest that gains are to be made by allowing for tolerance towards 
inflation. In the last ten years, Sweden has experienced episodes of almost 
price stability combined with historically very high unemployment rates of 
around 8 percent. A monetary policy based on price stability appears to be 
connected with substantial costs in terms of high unemployment and 
production foregone. 
Our estimated LSURI exceeds the present Swedish inflation target of 2 
percent, which indicates that unemployment could be reduced further if 
inflation were targeted at just a slightly higher rate. At the present inflation 
target   the minimum unemployment rate is, on average, 2.31 percent. The 
gain from accepting  the  slightly higher  LSURI  of 2.61 percent  is .23 
percentage points. If the European Central Bank targets inflation lower than 
two percent, Swedish membership in EMU would imply an even higher 
long run unemployment rate.   
 
Robustness tests 
So far, the results have indicated a great deal of robustness to variations in 
adaptive expectations. However, we are also interested in investigating how 
the model performs with respect to other definitions of unemployment and 
to other sample periods. We first explore the relationship between inflation 
and total, rather than open, unemployment. Since government expenditures 
                                                                 
12 This is model 5 of Table 1. Other models in Table 1 yield similar curves. 
13 The gains from accepting an inflation rate at LSURI are also obvious in Table 1. 
14 Comparing this figure to the corresponding one in ADP we find that the average gain 
seems to be larger in Sweden. See Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (2000), Figure 9.   19
affect open unemployment, and also change over the business cycle, one 
could argue that total unemployment better captures the relevant labor 
market situation. We therefore want to see if the LSURI we obtained based 
on open unemployment also will yield a lowest sustainable total unemploy-
ment. Moreover,  using total unemployment may simplify a comparison of 
our results to those that ADP obtained for the US since open unemploy-
ment would be considerably higher in Sweden in the absence of labor 
market programs.  
 
 
Figure 5. The Phillips curve: total and open unemployment    
 
Table A1, models A1 and A2, in the appendix displays some selected 
results based on total unemployment. A comparison with the results in 
Table 1 above show that the LSURI estimates are similar. In Figure 5, we 
show the long run Phillips curve for total unemployment and, for 
comparison, we have reproduced the curve based on open unemployment 
(see  Figure 3 ). If the purpose is to minimize the sustainable total 
unemployment, inflation should be at 2.83 percent, i.e. at approximately the 
same rate as previously obtained for open unemployment. The lowest 
sustainable total unemployment rate is 3.89 percent.  While this figure is 
considerably closer to the  LSURs estimated by ADP it still falls short of 
what appears to be the most common lowest unemployment rates in their 
study.
15 Many of their estimated LSURs exceed 4 percent. 
                                                                 























For sake of comparison with the results of ADP, we have also run some 
regressions  based on  prime aged males.  The results  based on  open 
unemployment among males of ages 25-54  are presented in Table  A1 
(models A3 and A4). As expected, this yielded considerably lower LSURs, 
but the corresponding inflation  rates  do not differ much from those 
previously obtained.  
The turbulent Swedish labor market of the 1990s involved a major 
increase in unemployment and a drastic decrease in inflation.  It seems 
reasonable to test if the exclusion of the 1990s yields very different results. 
In  Figure 6 we show the Phillips curve for 1963:1-1991:2 and (again) the 
Phillips curve for the period 1963:1-2000:2 . Excluding the 1990s implies a 
leftward shift of the curve: at a just slightly higher inflation rate  than for 
1963-2000, the average lowest sustainable unemployment rate is now as 
low as 1.26 percent. This result therefore suggests that the inclusion of the 
turbulent 1990s in data has some effect on LSUR, while the inflation rate 
remains stable.
16 The observed change in Figure 6 could indicate that some 
parameter shifts may have occurred during the 1990s, which our model is 
unable to capture accurately. However, re-estimating the model for the 
period 1963-2000 and adding a dummy shift variable for the 1990s did not 
yield a significantly different Phillips curve. 
 
 
Figure 6.   The Phillips curve: 1963-1991 and 1963-2000 
 
                                                                 
16 Table A1, models A5 and A6, reports some results based on the period up until the 
1990s. In particular the latter model yields a very low sustainable unemployment rate 
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4.2   Direct measures of expected inflation 
Since direct measures of expectations often are missing, the  standard 
practice in macroeconomic studies is to estimate adaptive expectations. It is 
far from obvious that such estimations capture households’ true 
expectations on inflation. To illustrate this point,  Figure  7 contrasts the 
estimated adaptive expectations based on model 5 in Table 1 to survey data 
on households’ expectations which is available for the period 1979:3-
2000:2. The estimated series follow CPI quite closely, which should come 
as no surprise since past CPI determines the estimated adaptive 
expectations. Notable is that there are apparent deviations from the directly 
measured  inflation  expectations.  Given that  the survey data better reflect 
households’ true inflation expectations, one might suspect that the results 
obtained above could be misleading. 
Although,  our survey d ata are restricted to the period 1979:3-2000:2, 
which precludes a perfect comparison of  survey data and  estimated 
expectations, we shall  re-estimate  the model using these data.  Since the 
results suggest that the length of the sample period may matter for the 
results, we  then  proceed by  imputing survey  data for  the period 1963:1-
1979:2  and estimate the model on a  full  survey  data series for 1963:1-
2000:2.  
The results of some of our regressions  using   survey data  1979:3-
2000:2 are reported in Table 2 as models 1, 2 and 3. In general, these  data 
yield a LSUR that is higher than for estimated adaptive expectations. This 
can be seen in Figure 8, which plots the combinations of LSUR and LSURI  
 




















survey expectations  22
in our regressions.  The  average LSUR using survey data is 2.85 percent 
while estimated expectations yield 2.08 percent. Also the average  LSURI 
has increased, from 2.61 percent to 4.01.
17  
Thus, not only is LSUR higher with survey data, but the corresponding 
LSURI is also considerably higher. There are several possible reasons for 
these differences. First, since the 1990s make up almost half of the sample 
period in the regressions based on survey data the differences could be the 
result of changes in the Swedish economy in this decade. Secondly, the 
short sample period could have introduced small sample bias. Finally, they 
could be the result of survey data yielding different results than estimated 
expectations. To shed further light on the issue we imputed survey data for 
the period 1963:1-1979:2 and added this series to the survey data 1979:3-
200:2 to obtain a full series for 1963:1-2000:2.
18 
Table 2, models 4-6, show detailed results from some regressions based 
on our extended survey data set. As seen in Figure 8, the LSURs are now 
similar to those obtained with estimated expectations. The average LSUR is 
now 2.29.  This suggests that the higher LSUR reported for our survey-
based regressions may be the result of the sample period. We also see that 
the  LSURIs are more in line with those obtained from the limited survey 
data. The average LSURI is now 4.24 percent.  
To sum up, Figure 9, shows three representative Phillips curves for the 
three alternative assumptions of how expectations are formed. Regressions 
based on the two survey data sets suggest that inflation needs to be around 
4 percent in order to be compatible with the lowest sustainable unemploy-
ment while adaptive expectations suggest a considerably lower LSURI. 
However, there are differences between the estimations based on survey 
data only and survey cum imputed data as the latter series, generates lower 
unemployment rates.  This strongly suggests that the reason why survey 







                                                                 
17 This is the average of only six regressions. 
18 We fitted a regression model that determines our survey data as a non-linear function 
of lagged CPI and predicted a series for the 1963:1-1979:2 period. To study the effects 
of the small sample, an  alternative approach  would be to perform regressions based on 
estimated expectations for the same period, 1979:3-2000:2. However, the results of this 
approach did not come out well, presumably because   the complexity of  our non-linear  
model causes the estimates to suffer from small sample bias.   23
Table 2. Estimated parameters for the long run Phillips curve
a 
Independent  
variables and  
characteristics 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
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Open unempl.  Open unempl.  Open unempl.  Open unempl.  Open unempl.  Open unempl. 
No. of unempl. 
lags  2  12  2  12  2  12 
Sample period  1979:3-2000:2  1979:3-2000:2  1979:3-2000:2  1963:1-2000:2  1963:1-2000:2  1963:1-2000:2 
LSURI  3.76  4.01  3.97  4.50  3.83  4.47 
LSUR  2.09  2.96  3.52  2.31  2.35  2.26 
F(p=0.0)  13.0  18.2  30.5  9.6  6.3  9.4 
F(p=2.0)  18.5  23.4  36.0  13.0  10.4  12.8 
F(p=4.0)  42.0  42.7  53.5  27.5  33.2  27.6 
F(p=6.0)  83.1  76.4  79.8  61.3  82.7  62.1 
u(p=0.0)  7.57  6.52  7.45  7.26  7.55  7.22 
u(p=2.0)  3.75  4.14  4.74  4.35  4.08  4.29 
u(p=4.0)  2.13  2.96  3.52  2.42  2.37  2.35 
u(p=6.0)  5.18  4.33  4.89  3.38  5.54  3.40 
DW-statistic  1.002  1.150  1.056  1.544  1.283  1.432 
R
2  0.933  0.948  0.931  0.876  0.847  0.872 
a Asymptotic t-values in parentheses. Detailed results for all regressions are available on request.
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Figure 8. Lowest sustainable unemployment rate 
 
 
Figure 9. The Phillips Curve 
 
 
Note also that the survey cum  imputed data suggest a very high 
unemployment rate at price stability, i.e. at zero inflation. There appear to 
be extreme costs in terms of high unemployment, around 7.5 percent, by 
aiming at price stability. Comparing LSUR to the unemployment  rate at 
zero inflation u(p=0.0) in Table 2 we see that there are very large potential 
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We have estimated long run Phillips curves and it is not obvious how 
they should be related to the present macroeconomic situation. As of today, 
the Riksbank has maintained the 2 percent inflation target for eight years. 
Unemployment has since 1997 come down from around 8 percent and 
appears to have stabilized at a level somewhat above 4 percent. A possible 
interpretation is that unemployment has stabilized at a rate consistent with 
the inflation target. At 2 percent inflation, estimations on survey  cum 
imputed data suggest an unemployment rate a lmost exactly at the actual 
unemployment  slightly exceeding    four percent. Moreover, during the 
periods of price stability and deflation in Sweden, the unemployment rate 
was around 8 percent, also in line with the regression results based on these 
data. 
Our results based on estimated expectations suggest that, on average, 2 
percent inflation corresponds to 2.3 percent unemployment, which is way 
off the present situation. Thus, if one interprets the present macroeconomic 
situation as reflecting one of the long run, the survey cum imputed data 
appear consistent with actual data, while the results based on  estimated 
expectations do not. 
 
 
5.   Concluding remarks 
 
The ADP model suggests that the standard NAIRU model is not very 
robust with respect to alternative assumptions. Based on a range of 
evidence on decision-making, actual reactions to inflation, actual wage 
setting etc. and having shown that disregarding inflation is not costly to 
firms at low levels of inflation, a model is derived that yields a long run 
trade-off between inflation and unemployment at low levels of inflation. 
Only when inflation is high, and enters wage-and price setters’ perceptions, 
will inflation be fully considered and unemployment will stabilize around a 
fixed level. 
The derived shape of the long run Phillips curve suggests why it has 
been difficult to estimate a NAIRU point, particularly at low inflation rates. 
The empirical results presented in our paper for Sweden and in the ADP 
study for the US strongly suggest that different forces are at work at low 
inflation levels than at high inflation levels. The crucial aspect is the fairly 
general specification of the coefficient on expected inflation that in 
principle could capture anything that makes this coefficient contingent on 
the level of inflation. As such, one could see the estimated model as   26
considerably more general and that it captures any reason for why the 
coefficient would depend on the inflation level.  
The theory on which our estimations rely specifies the lowest sustainable 
unemployment rate and an inflation rate that yields this rate (LSURI). 
However, this rate is in general not the point that maximizes output, since 
productivity in the economy is not maximized at LSURI. GDP maximi-
zation would involve accepting an even higher inflation rate than LSURI, 
and also accepting a higher unemployment rate. Output will be higher on 
the positively sloped part of the Phillips curve than on the negatively 
sloped part.  
Our estimations based on survey  cum imputed data suggest that if the 
Swedish inflation target is raised from 2  percent to around 4, unemploy-
ment could in the long run settle at slightly above 2 percent. This point of a 
minimum unemployment is lower than the figure ADP estimate for the US, 
and we should in general find that these lowest long run unemployment 
rates  differ across countries. Regressions based on different adaptive 
expectations schemes, suggest that inflation around 2.6 percent is con-
sistent with unemployment around 2 percent. These data therefore suggest 
that the present inflation target is less off the one consistent with the lowest 
sustainable rate of unemployment.  
There is not much in favor of the idea that the inflation rate that 
minimizes unemployment should be identical a cross the EMU member 
states.
19 This is of course an empirical issue but if this is the case, the single 
inflation rate that the European Central Bank targets could imply large 
differences in the long run unemployment rates across the member 
countries. Our r esults also suggest that if Sweden joins the EMU and the 
ECB continues to aim at an inflation rate less than 2 percent, long run 
unemployment will rise in Sweden and we would move further away from 




                                                                 
19 Cf. Wyplosz (2001).   27
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CPI (Consumer Price Index): 
1959:1-2000:2 from Statistics Sweden.   
Our quarterly data are calculated as arithmetic averages of the monthly figures. 
We use an annualized inflation rate, obtained by (CPIt-CPIt-1)/CPIt-1. 
 
IPI (Import Price Index): 
1963:1-2000:2 from Statistics Sweden. 
This index reflects the prices of goods imported to Sweden. Our quarterly data are 
calculated as arithmetic averages of the monthly figures. 
 
Import shares: 
1963-2000 from Statistics Sweden. 
For each year we calculate the value of goods and services imported to Sweden as a 
share of GDP at market prices. We then assign the same import share to each quarter. 
 
Survey data on expected inflation: 
1979:3-2000:2 from the National Institute of Economic Research. Quarterly data on 
households’ expectations on CPI one year ahead, collected every quarter. 
 
Unemployment: 
1959:1-2000:2 from Statistics Sweden (AKU).  




1965:1-2000:2 from Statistics Sweden (AKU). Seasonally adjusted data on open 
unemployment plus workers in active labor market programs (aged 16-64). 
 
Male unemployment: 
1959:1-2000:2 from Statistics Sweden (AKU). Seasonally adjusted data on open 
unemployment for men aged 25-54 
 
Dummy variables: 
1.  D1=1 for 1970:3-1970:4, zero otherwise. 
2.  D2=1 for 1973:1-1974:1, zero otherwise. 
3.  D3=1 for 1974:3, zero otherwise. 
4.  D4=1 for 1975:3, zero otherwise. 
5.  D5=1 for 1979:1-1980:1, zero otherwise. 
6.  D6=1 for 1980:2-1981:3, zero otherwise. 
7.  D7=1 for 1981:4-1983:3, zero otherwise. 
8.  D8=1 for 1986:1-1986:4, zero otherwise. 
9.  D9=1 for 1990:1-1991:2, zero otherwise. 
10. D10=1 for 1995:3-1996:2, zero otherwise. 
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Table A1. Estimated parameters for the long run Phillips curve
a 
Independent  
variables and  
characteristics 
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weights for each 
quarter, eq. (18) 
16-quarter lag 
with different 
weights for each 
quarter, eq. (18) 
Geometrically 
declining 
weights, eq. (16) 
16-quarter MA 
with different 
weights for each 
year, eq. (18) 
16-quarter lag 
with different 
weights for each 
quarter, eq. (18) 
Geometrically 
declining 
weights, eq. (17) 
Unemployment 
measure  Total unempl.  Total unempl.  Male unempl.  Male unempl.  Open unempl.  Open unempl. 
No. of unempl. 
lags 
2  12  2  12  2  12 
Sample period  1965:1-2000:2  1965:1-2000:2  1963:1-2000:2  1963:1-2000:2  1963:1-1991:2  1963:1-1991:2 
LSURI  2.77  2.91  2.54  2.65  2.86  2.70 
LSUR  4.06  4.26  1.67  1.61  1.32  1.18 
F(p=0.0)  56.7  72.5  53.6  57.4  4.0  6.8 
F(p=2.0)  65.0  77.6  63.9  66.4  11.5  17.1 
F(p=4.0)  84.3  89.2  87.7  87.0  67.1  74.9 
F(p=6.0)  98.3  97.9  99.4  98.9  99.9  100.0 
u(p=0.0)  7.70  7.59  4.26  3.95  2.99  3.54 
u(p=2.0)  4.41  4.65  1.82  1.79  1.58  1.45 
u(p=4.0)  4.87  4.76  2.59  2.28  1.94  2.28 
u(p=6.0)  7.21  6.78  4.14  3.75  2.98  3.53 
DW-statistic  1.524  1.534  1.500  1.523  1.509  1.797 
R
2  0.876  0.891  0.872  0.872  0.839  0.839 
a
 Asymptotic t-values in parentheses. Detailed results for all regressions are available on request.
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